

**SECRET**

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Wednesday - 11 March 1970

Page 2

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5. [REDACTED] Called the office of Representative Frank Bow (R., Ohio) and in his absence requested that he call me to arrange a date for a briefing on our [REDACTED] (concerning which he had queried the Director during our recent appearance before our House Appropriations Subcommittee.)

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6. [REDACTED] Met with Representative Clement Zablocki (D., Wis.) and Mr. George Berdes, Administrative Assistant to the Representative, in response to the request of the Representative's office in assistance in locating an unclassified film on the Katyn Forest atrocities. Representative Zablocki advised that he has a constituent request for the film. He also told me that he believed that a film was made up by a commission that included among its members Representatives Ray J. Madden (D., Ind.) and Roman Pucinski (D., Ill.). I told him that I would relay this information and be back in touch.

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7. [REDACTED] Met with Mr. Daniel Manelli, Staff Attorney, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and returned to him the initial draft of the sections of the Committee report on CBS news programming that make reference to the Agency. I told Manelli that we had no suggestions, comments, or changes in the draft. He told me that he could not put a date on the completion of the final draft, but that he would call me so that we might have another look-see at that time.

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8. [REDACTED] Delivered to Miss Judy Spahr, on the staff of the National Security and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Government Operations Committee, the [REDACTED] report STATSPEC on the Moscow Pravda "observer" article on the SALT talks.

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9. [REDACTED] Met with Mr. Arthur Kuhl, Chief Clerk, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who requested that the 28 October 1969 transcript of the Director's briefing on Laos be forwarded each day to the Committee through the rest of the week.

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CRC, 3/13/2003

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Monday - 9 March 1970

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1. ( [ ] ) Hand carried 20 copies of the Director's prepared statement to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

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2. [ ] Talked with Lee Williams, on the staff of Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), about the handling of STATSPEC [ ] items in which the Senator is mentioned. Williams said it would facilitate matters for them if these are sent directly to Carl Marcy, Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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3. [ ] Talked to Mr. Arthur Kuhl, Chief Clerk, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who advised that the transcripts of the Director's testimony of 28 October 1969 and 2 March 1970 will not be needed on a daily basis after today. He noted in passing that Senator Stephen Young (D., Ohio) has not reviewed these transcripts. (See Journal items of 4 and 5 March.)

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4. [ ] Talked to Mr. Ralph Preston, House Appropriations Committee staff, and made the necessary administrative arrangements for the Director's meeting with Chairman Mahon and the Special Subcommittee at 2:30 this afternoon in room HB18 of the Capitol.

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5. [ ] Delivered to Mr. Ralph Preston, House Appropriations Committee staff, for Chairman Mahon a letter from the Director concerning withdrawal of funds from the Reserves.

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6. [ ] Received a call from Judy Spahr, on the staff of the National Security and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Government Operations Committee, who requested a copy of the Pravda article signed "Observer" of about 7 March regarding ABM and the SALT talks which was referenced in the Washington Post and the New York Times this weekend. [ ] DDI, has been advised.

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STATSPEC

SALT TALKS

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PRAVDA 'OBSERVER' ARTICLE QUESTIONS SALT TALKS

STATSPEC Moscow PRAVDA

[Article by Observer: "An Important Problem"]

[Text] The Soviet-American talks on the limitation of the strategic arms race--which took place at the end of last year in Helsinki and will be resumed in Vienna on 16 April--are arousing the unremitting interest of the international public. It is evident that a great deal in insuring international security will depend upon whether there is success in ending or at least limiting this race.

The Soviet Union unswervingly advocates the peaceful coexistence of states--irrespective of their social system--peace, and security. Its consistent and principled position aimed at easing international tension and at ending the arms race is extensively known. At its foundation lies the peoples' fundamental interests--strengthening peace and organizing good relations between states. This is an ineradicable feature of USSR foreign policy. General and complete disarmament is the most radical method of eliminating the dangers connected with the accumulation of increasingly more powerful means of destruction. During the entire history of the Soviet state the Soviet Government has repeatedly advanced proposals for implementing such disarmament.

In waging the struggle for general and complete disarmament our state by no means believes that here one can be guided by the principle "all or nothing." Given the presently continuing process of accumulating armaments, including the most destructive armaments, the interests of the struggle for peace demand utilization of all opportunities for restricting the arms race, reducing military danger, and relaxing international tension.

Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union has proposed and does propose the implementation, through reaching agreement, of a number of such measures which would reduce tension, cut back the scales of the arms race whipped up by the aggressive imperialist circles, and avert the possibility of the unleashing of a thermonuclear war. Limiting the strategic arms race could become one of the important and timely steps in this direction.

The 1963 Moscow treaty on banning nuclear tests, the 1967 treaty on space, which particularly envisages banning the orbiting of nuclear weapons and emplacing them on the moon and other heavenly bodies, the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and certain other international agreements were the beginning of the movement in such a direction. Article 6 of the nonproliferation treaty, which came into force on 5 March this year, specifically commits its signatories to conduct, in the spirit of good will, talks on effective measures for ending the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament as well as talks on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Undoubtedly, the efforts not of one or two states but the united efforts of the world's states are required to resolve the problem of general and complete disarmament. Nuclear disarmament requires the participation of all nuclear states. At the same time the correlation of strategic forces on an international scale is now such that the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union--which possess the greatest nuclear potential--aimed at the limitation of the strategic arms race could greatly promote the interests of the security of other countries also, along with the interests of universal peace.

SALT TALKS

Of course, to do this it is necessary that a serious and honest approach be taken by both sides, an approach shorn of intention to achieve unilateral advantages by means of talks or to utilize the talks as a cover for the development of a new round in the arms race.

In its approach to the resolution of the problem of limiting the strategic arms race, and also in its approach to the disarmament problem as a whole, the Soviet Union is invariably guided by the interests of strengthening general security and consolidating peace.

The present-day situation is such that science and technology have enabled man not only to harness the power of the atom, to create cybernetic and computer devices which considerably ease man's mental labor, to build anew new branches of industry, to revolutionize the science of control, and to accomplish a breakthrough in space, but has also placed in man's hands weapons of destruction which are monstrous in their force. Recent years have seen the creation of new generations of missiles, submarines, bombers, and other offensive means which are much more powerful and yet at the same time less vulnerable than their predecessors. The emergence of the new offensive means has brought into being means of combating them, and this, in its turn, has entailed a further improvement of the offensive means. Thus, there has arisen a real threat of the beginning of a new stage in the arms race, which on the political and military plane means the intensification of the danger of a world thermonuclear conflict.

The military-strategic balance of forces existing in the world makes quite unrealistic any of the West's militarist circles' calculations about the possibility of winning in the event of a thermonuclear war, and judging from everything, a new spiral in the arms race could not change the essence of this balance. If an unrestricted strategic arms race were to take place, one could expect a growth in the imperialist aggressive circles' illusions about the possibilities of obtaining military superiority, and, consequently, also the temptation to put fate to the test by means of unleashing a thermonuclear war.

On the admission of many bourgeois figures in the West who are fully informed about the true state of things, with every passing year the arms race becomes increasingly more unpromising. Thus, former adviser to Presidents Johnson and Kennedy on questions of security and military strategy McGeorge Bundy wrote recently: "A strategic nuclear engagement cannot lead to any kind of gain either from the viewpoint of national interests or from the viewpoint of ideology or the individual political positions of any leader in this or that country. None of the weapons systems now seemingly within the reach of this or that side can change this fact."

Meanwhile the race for strategic offensive and defensive weapons is using up huge resources. According to appraisals by the American press the cost of building the safeguard ABM system, which is now being developed, will reach approach 50 billion dollars.

If the strategic arms race is not halted there may be a repeat of what happened as regards nuclear weapons when in 1946, as a result of the refusal of the United States and other Western countries to accept the sound and concrete Soviet proposals on the banning and liquidation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear arms race started.

How then can a barrier be erected in the path of a further strategic arms race? The USSR and the United States have set about finding an answer to this question in Helsinki.

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SALT TALKS

The very fact that talks on such an important question have begun between the USSR and the United States has enjoyed broad support on the part of the peace-loving public and the more farsighted political and government figures, including those in Western countries. Commenting on the Helsinki talks the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote that "in the United States the public yearns for an end to the fruitless accumulation of weapons." Here the world press has noted the Soviet Union's serious and businesslike approach to the talks--an approach that has also been recognized by U.S. officials, the chief of the U.S. delegation, G. Smith, and delegation member and former U.S. ambassador to Moscow L. Thompson, at a press conference in Washington on 30 December 1969.

However, there are also forces--and these too are precisely in the West--that are not pleased with the talks on the restriction of strategic weapons and even less pleased with the prospect of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on this question. For example, the West German newspaper DIE WELT and certain other press organs, reflecting the attitude of the more reactionary, militarist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, have actually spoken out against the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of the strategic arms race. The enemies of the restriction of the strategic arms race directly in the United States have also been more active recently.

It is impossible to pass over the fact that precisely now, on the threshold of the round of talks in Vienna, many U.S. newspapers and journals have started to write less frequently about the restriction of the strategic arms race, while giving somewhat more space to a diametrically opposed theme--the question of developing and deploying new systems of strategic armaments. In essence this campaign was begun by Defense Secretary Laird. The leader of the U.S. military department has recently made a whole series of public speeches in which he persistently calls for the buildup of various systems of strategic armaments. Laird particularly zealously insists that the development of the Safeguard ABM system should be immediately accelerated in the United States, and he is fighting for increased congressional appropriations for this purpose.

Neither is it possible not to be alarmed by how often and how many times the defense secretary discusses Pentagon plans for creating new offensive strategic weapons systems. For example, at a press conference on 7 January, Laird designated the creation of a new strategic bomber to replace the B-52 and the development of improved underwater long-range offensive systems "as a most important task." He also advocated the development of an improved offensive intercontinental ballistic missile and so forth. On his own admission, many of the projects mentioned above are already in the "research and development" stage.

It is characteristic that whereas last year in seeking congressional approval of appropriations in the first place, for the Safeguard system, the government certified that the latter's further development would depend to a large extent on the results of the SALT talks with the USSR, Now U.S. leaders prefer not to recall this.

The defense secretary is lavishly spicing his demands for the intensification of the arms race with references to the mythical "Soviet Threat." The utter groundlessness of such accusations directed against the Soviet Union is obvious. It is well known that the measures implemented in the USSR in the postwar period to strengthen its defense capability were a reply to the unrestrained race in nuclear missiles and other arms whipped up by the United States.

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SALT TALKS

is sufficient to recall that hitherto the notorious theory of the need to insure military supremacy over the Soviet Union has been rife in the United States, particularly in military circles. The New York POST reasonably suggests: "In the light of the Pentagon's traditional negative approach to disarmament it is logical to suspect that this argument is designed to prevent the United States from holding talks."

The American press is paying attention to the fact that the voice of those who are seeking an increase in appropriations for military preparations is resounding ever louder in Washington. The New York TIMES recently wrote: "In the process of elaborating the American position in the talks with the Soviet Union on the restriction of strategic arms, some alarming signs of the military's excessive influence have come to light...."

In connection with Laird's increasingly frequent speeches in favor of the accumulation of U.S. strategic arms, many American observers are pointing out that this answers the interests of the military-industrial complex. It is no secret that the military-industrial complex would like to start an expensive new round in the strategic arms race, whip up a militaristic tendency in Washington's foreign policy, and lead matters to a further exacerbation of international tension.

Laird's traditional inclination toward bellicose speeches does not surprise us, but nobody can close their eyes to the fact that he occupies the responsible post of a member of the government. Every one of Laird's public statements is legitimately regarded by the public as a statement or reflection of the U.S. ruling circles' positions. It is asked: To what extent do Secretary Laird's militaristic appeals reflect the position of the U.S. Government?

A number of observers including those in the United States itself, are asking the question with a certain uneasiness; but is not this entire campaign in the United States for the benefit of the further development of the arms race a new relapse of the old American political disease which acquired, back in the time of J.F. Dulles, a sad notoriety under the name of the "position of strength policy"? What is the correlation between the well-intentioned official speeches which ring out at times in the United States in connection with negotiations, and those deeds and tendencies which are manifest in practice in the development of the strategic arms race? Is it really not clear that the essence of the position is tested by actions, by practice, and not by statements for the sake of effect if they are not confirmed in fact, and if they are not translated into meality.

If the vestiges of former notions from which even J.F. Dulles was forced to depart in his last years as secretary of state really are being return in the United States, then such a development of events cannot fail to give rise to the most serious doubts regarding the sincerity of U.S. intentions with regard to talks with the Soviet Union on limiting the strategic arms race.

History has many times irrefutably proved the whole groundlessness and illusionary quality of the calculations of those who have tried to talk to the Soviet Union "from a position of strength." The policy of pressure on the USSR is an attempt by unsuitable means. No one can have, nor must have any illusions on this score. The past half century has shown in deeds the capability of the working class and of all the working people of the Soviet Union to prove the firmness of their socialist gains and of the international positions of our motherland.

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SALT TALKS

The question is involuntarily asked: Do the latest statements by Washington officials about the further accumulation of armaments not reflect the growing influence of those military-political forces in the United States which do not want agreement with the USSR on strategic arms limitation? Such a question has recently been appearing more and more frequently on the pages of the American press too.

The solution of questions connected with strategic arms race limitation is doubtlessly not among the simplest of tasks. This is explained not only by the nature of these armaments, but also by the fact that the solution of problems connected with them touches upon such a sensitive question for every state as the problem of national security.

All the same, despite the difficulties, it is obvious that there is still time and there are still possibilities for reaching an understanding which all states are waiting for and which they will gain by. However, an indispensable condition for this, as the experience of international relations convincingly testifies, is the existence of goodwill on the part of both sides and the striving for mutually acceptable agreement. If both sides intend to hold honest talks without striving to obtain any unilateral military advantages and if the negotiations proceed from the necessity of insuring equal security for both sides with the simultaneous complete consideration of the task of reducing military danger and consolidating peace as a whole, then one can count on achieving agreed solutions. But if one of the sides tries to use the talks merely as a screen for expanding the strategic arms race, then naturally the whole weight of political responsibility for all the consequences of such a position will fall on it.

As the USSR delegation in Helsinki emphasized, the Soviet Union is approaching the talks with the most serious intentions and is striving to achieve a mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial understanding. At the basis of the Soviet approach to the problem of restricting strategic arms there is no desire to receive any additional unilateral advantages for itself in the sphere of safeguarding just its security alone. The Soviet Union has at its disposal an arsenal of modern armaments enabling the interests of the security of the USSR and its allies to be guaranteed to the necessary degree. The Soviet Union's position on this question is determined by concern for strengthening international security without harming the interests of all other countries.

The solution of the disarmament problem would help to release from the sphere of military production colossal means which are expended on armaments throughout the world and whose utilization on economic development needs could assist the scientific, technical, and economic progress of all mankind, including the most developed capitalist countries, where the ostentatious prosperity of the minority cannot conceal, on the admission even of the bourgeois governments and press, the glaring elementary needs and requirements of the working majority.

The Soviet Union has confirmed by deeds its sincere interest in assisting by all possible means the solution of the tasks which ever more acutely face mankind in the field of restraining the arms race and of advancing along the path leading to partial disarmament measures and to universal and complete disarmament. Only such a path can provide an effective solution to the problems connected with insuring a stable peace.